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KNOWLEDGE SHARING AND NATIONAL CULTURE: 




Much of the knowledge management literature tends to assume a rather universalist 
understanding of knowledge sharing. Yet, attitudes to knowledge sharing as well as actual 
knowledge-sharing behaviour depend on conditions that vary across institutional and cultural 
environments. This paper contributes to the knowledge-sharing literature by specifically 
discussing the interplay between knowledge-sharing and national cultural factors in the context of 
transition countries. The paper engages in a comparative examination of two major transition 
societies, China and Russia, and contributes to understanding the complexity of differences 
between transition economies. The paper is written as a set of theoretical arguments and 
propositions that is designed to elucidate more nuanced ways of thinking about knowledge 
sharing in China and Russia. We argue that in the case of China and Russia, vertical 
individualism and particularist social relations facilitate knowledge sharing. We also maintain 
that there are important differences between China and Russia in terms of motivation for 
knowledge sharing and propose that the differences between the two countries in terms of origins 
of collectivism and degree of collectivism impact on knowledge sharing in organisations in these 
two countries. Research and management implications are also outlined. 
 
Keywords: China, knowledge sharing, national culture, Russia 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the knowledge management literature tends to assume a rather universalist 
understanding of knowledge sharing. Yet, attitudes to knowledge sharing as well as actual 
knowledge-sharing behaviour depend on conditions that vary across cultural and institutional 
contexts. Holden (2002) argued that knowledge management operates in a kind of a vacuum, in 
which cultural diversity is compressed into one giant independent variable, which does not allow 
for the influence of cultural factors to be approached as variables in understanding attitudes and 
approaches to knowledge sharing. Further, Lam (2000) maintained that the ability of an 
organisation to harness knowledge is influenced by broader societal and institutional factors.  
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 There are a number of issues that make the process of knowledge sharing complex. First, 
it can be argued that knowledge is created by individuals (Grant, 1996) and is developed from the 
local level (Lave 1988; Orr 1990), i.e. knowledge sharing is embedded in a certain cognitive and 
behavioural context. Without understanding the context, one cannot inquire into the reasoning 
and the assumptions behind the particular piece of knowledge. Second, it has been argued that 
knowledge resides in people’s minds where it tends to be more tacit than well articulated 
(Gersick and Hackman, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992). Yet, while this separation in the typology 
should not be interpreted as implying that tacit knowledge can be rigidly compartmentalised in 
the real world (Brown and Woodland, 1999), Polanyi (1966: 6) has pointed out that tacit 
knowledge is an integrating force that binds and shapes all knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 1991; 
Hansen et al., 1999). Third, knowledge is asymmetrically distributed in any organisation. Often 
those who possess knowledge are inclined not to invest resources to share knowledge without an 
expectation of  reciprocity, as these resources are finite and scarce (Davenport and Prusak, 1998; 
O’Dell and Grayson, 1998). Thus, both society and organisations face the problem of how to use 
widely dispersed knowledge, and, therefore, how to extend the span of utilisation of resources in 
a way that exceeds the span of control of any one mind (Tsoukas, 1996). Fourth, knowledge 
sharing is voluntary (Dixon, 2002). It depends on the willingness of individuals to identify the 
knowledge they possess and to share it when required (Nonaka, 1994). Knowledge sharing 
involves commitment from both transmitter and receiver. If the potential knowledge transmitter is 
not aware that someone in the organisation may be interested in the knowledge s/he possesses, 
s/he will not actively participate in sharing this knowledge. Similarly, if the potential receiver is 
not aware of the existence of a particular piece of knowledge, it is unlikely that s/he will seek it 
(Bouty, 2000). Fifth, as human behaviour is inherently opportunistic, adverse selection and moral 
hazard may influence the individual’s motivation to share knowledge in a negative manner. The 
provider needs to trust that the receiver will not exploit the shared knowledge for purposes other 
than those agreed upon, implicitly as well as explicitly (Bouty, 2000). Finally, an individual’s 
ability to appreciate new knowledge is a function of their “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990). Related to this, von Krogh et al. (2000) describe people as dealing with twin 
processes of assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation, in this respect, refers to the process 
of integrating input from the environment into one’s existing experiences. When individuals 
encounter new situations for which they have no ready or clear responses, accommodation 
dominates instead; a process by which people give meaning to new input, distinguishing it as 
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something that lies beyond what they already know. When accommodation becomes too 
challenging, individual barriers to appreciating new knowledge appear.  
 The aforementioned issues in knowledge sharing are thoroughly discussed in the 
knowledge-sharing literature. Yet, an issue that has been erstwhile under-explored is how 
knowledge sharing is influenced by national culture, particularly in the context of transition 
economies. In addressing this gap in the literature, we examine the research question: How is 
knowledge sharing in Chinese and Russian organisations influenced by distinctive national 
cultural attributes? We utilise a definition of “knowledge” as “a fluid mix of framed experience, 
values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and 
incorporating new experiences and information” (Davenport and Prusak, 1998: 5). We take 
“knowledge sharing” to mean providing one’s knowledge to others as well as receiving 
knowledge from others (Davenport and Prusak, 1998). 
 In addressing our research question, we engage in a comparative examination of China 
and Russia in terms of national cultural characteristics so as to analyse how Chinese and Russians 
are distinct in their knowledge sharing. For this purpose we introduce a group-level analysis. An 
analysis of group membership and group dynamics offers a good link between the macro and the 
individual level as well as providing several findings to guide our proposition development. As 
will be demonstrated throughout the paper, the distinction between in-groups and out-groups 
proves particularly important in the Chinese and Russian cultural contexts. Accordingly, the 
following section introduces some of the literature about in-groups and out-groups. This is 
followed by an overall comparative examination of China and Russia. We then discuss 
similarities and differences between the two countries, particularly  in respect to individualism-
collectivism and universalism-particularism and develop propositions about how knowledge 
sharing differs in Chinese and Russian organisations. The final section suggests future research 
directions and outlines important managerial implications.   
 
IN-GROUPS AND OUT-GROUPS 
By introducing the notions of in-groups and out-groups Sumner (1906) set the stage for a long 
line of research on how group identification affects an individual’s perceptions of, as well as 
attitudes and behaviour toward, other people and groups. An in-group has been defined as a 
social group of which an individual is identifiably a member whereas an out-group is a social 
group to which this individual does not belong (Sumner, 1906). Out-groups are usually identified 
in reference to a specific in-group.  
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Graen et al. (1972) defined the concept of in-group and out-group membership in the 
context of a vertical dyad linkage model of leadership, in which an individual’s relationship to a 
work group is largely a function of each member’s association with an in-group or out-group, and 
group membership status depends upon an individual’s relationship to the group’s leader. Within 
vertical dyad linkage theory, leader-member relationships are classified into in-group and out-
group categories (Tosi et al., 2000: 476). In in-groups, relationships between leaders and 
subordinates are close and participants note more positive orientation to the job, whereas in out-
groups relationships, the subordinates are less involved in decision-making (Dienesch and Liden, 
1986). 
 Moreover, the literature on intergroup conflict highlights changes in attitudes and 
behaviour between in- and out-groups when there is intergroup conflict (Feldman and Arnold, 
1983). It has been suggested that four types of dynamics occur, including: substantial selective 
perception about one’s own group and a systematic distortion of perceptions about the other 
groups; win-lose positioning (Filley, 1977); increased hostility toward the rival group (Levine 
and Campbell, 1972); and decreased interaction and communication between the groups, 
reinforcing  negative stereotypes of other groups. Information passed between groups is very 
carefully rationed and sometimes deliberately distorted (Feldman and Arnold, 1983). A smaller 
body of literature has analysed in-groups and out-groups where there is no direct conflict. 
Bouwen (2001) referred to the in-group/out-group nature of departments within organisations and 
proffers that such distinctions can be manifest in power strife between such departments. 
Moreover, Granitz and Ward (2001) argued that individuals will be more likely to share ethical 
reasoning and moral intent with members of their in-group tending to overstate this sharing with 
in-group members and understate it with out-groups.   
Triandis (1988) defined an in-group as a group of people who share common interests and 
have a concern for each other’s welfare, and whose members may include family, distant 
relatives, co-workers, and members of political and/or religious groups to which an individual 
belongs. Tajfel (1982) suggested that individuals form in-groups based on mutual interests and 
common traits since they are most likely to receive reinforcement for such traits from similar 
others. In-group members view their long-term welfare in terms of the successes of the group 
(Earley, 1993). Importantly, Triandis (1988) argued that in-group membership is culturally 
variable. Earley (1989: 577) concluded that collectivists perform best in high shared-
responsibility settings and gain satisfaction and feelings of accomplishment from group 
outcomes. In collectivist cultures, individuals feel a moral obligation towards their in-group and a 
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lack of interest in those that are considered as out-group. In these cultures the boundary between 
the individuals’ in-group and other groups is very distinctive and salient (Iyengar et al., 1999) 
with strong trust felt in in-group others but weaker, or complete lack of, trust in out-group others 
(Chen et al., 2002). Earley (1993) reaffirmed that the performance of individualists who thought 
they were working in an in-group or out-group was lower than the performance of individualists 
working alone, whereas collectivists’ performance was lower in an individual or out-group 
context than in an in-group context. Along with the culturally-based explanations of the 
importance of the distinction between in- and out-group members, Boisot and Child (1999: 246) 
have employed an institutionally-based argument and pointed out that the in-group becomes the 
mode of transaction for transition societies. These societies are a long way from “rule of law” 
states; they remain “rule of relationships” (Brady 1999: 187). Such a noted  interplay between 
culture and institutions makes consideration of the in-group/out-group dimension of our research 
question particularly pertinent. 
  
A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF CHINA AND RUSSIA 
China and Russia share a number of similarities but also have marked differences, as we have 
summarised in Table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
China and Russia are both large countries with China’s 1.3 billion people constituting 22% of the 
world’s population while Russia has the largest territory in the world. Both are multiethnic states 
with heterogeneous populations dominated by a single group, Han Chinese and ethnic Russians, 
respectively. Both countries were great powers in the past and are important in terms of economic 
potential and military power at present. Both, and simultaneously, are undertaking pathways to 
capitalism. Both countries are becoming federal states and in each of them, some of the power 
that was once concentrated in the two capitals has dispersed to their regions. In post-Cold War 
China and Russia, nationalism is the one cause that seems capable of uniting the country and 
rallying support for its rulers (Mandelbaum, 1997). Both countries have key roles to play in 
establishing international stability. Not least, the rapid development in China and Russia has 
turned many of the widely-held views about transition into myths (Murrell, 2001).   
 Another important similarity between China and Russia is the lack of sufficient 
regulatory environments. Both countries have been ruled by the Communist Party for more than 
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fifty years, a time in which the Party placed itself (and, in the case of China, continues to place 
itself) above the law (Yergin and Gustafson, 1994; Chai, 1998). The lack of rule by law means 
that accessing external knowledge necessitates having in-group status with those who have 
knowledge. The lawlessness means that rules can be interpreted very differently according to 
one’s position in society i.e. whether one has in-group status with the necessary authorities. The 
existing rules and regulations are easily violated and written contracts have little value. In the 
absence of well-developed legal and distribution systems, personal relationships are essential to 
getting anything done. Circumventing laws and directives is long-ingrained in Russia’s political 
history and structures (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003). In China the cultivation of personal 
connections has proved a substitute for reliable government and established rule of law. In the 
absence of effective state institutions as regulators of transactions, personal networks and in-
groups have been essential to doing business (Xin and Pearce, 1996). The importance of personal 
connections and informal influence in the Russian context has also been emphasised by a number 
of researchers (Berliner, 1988; Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos, 1990; Beamish, 1992, Puffer, 1994; 
Michailova and Worm, 2003). The insufficiency of the regulatory environment in China and 
Russia is substituted with dyad-based reciprocity within the boundaries of groups.  
And yet, there are important differences between these two countries (Table 1). China is a 
rising superpower while Russia is struggling to capture its lost glory after having been a 
superpower for more than 50 years. Since 1978, China has been renowned as a  success story for 
its implementation of economic reforms and consistent growth. Over the last decade the Chinese 
economy’s share of global output has doubled to 4% (Business Week, May 2004) and China’s 
GDP has grown at one of the highest rates in the world, with an average annual GDP growth rate 
exceeding 10% in the last two decades (World Bank, 2000). The country’s share of world trade 
rose from less than 1% in 1979 to 5.5% in 2003 (Prasad and Rumbaugh, 2003: 46) and the new 
private sector has thrived. In sharp contrast, Russia has changed its position as the second largest 
economy in the world during Soviet times to the 12th largest at present. Russia’s GDP growth 
rates are among the lowest in the world and the private sector has stagnated. Moreover, whereas 
China has a moderately low country risk level and provides high rates of expected returns, 
Russia’s country risk throughout the 1990s was the highest in the world and expected rates of 
return offered by privatised manufacturing firms were low (Buck at. al., 2000). 
 China and Russia have chosen very different paths to capitalism. China has adopted an 
incremental approach to market reforms. The shift from planning and administration of a socialist 
economy to the regulation of a market economy has been, and is, taking place as a large-scale 
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gradual change project carefully monitored and controlled by the central authorities. The Chinese 
reformers have maintained central planning and opted for a hybrid model that allows the 
coexistence of plan and market. The Russian approach has been very different. Following the 
recommendations by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Harvard advisory 
teams, in 1992 Russia went for a shock therapy demanding immediate political and social reform. 
The economic aim was to rapidly replace the system of central planning with market-based 
mechanisms. The very meaning of the big bang approach was to destruct the centralised 
organisation of production and construct new market institutions.  
 As can be seen from the above comparative examination of China and Russia, a dynamic 
interplay exists between institutional and cultural factors. We acknowledge that, with respect to 
some issues, it is difficult to draw boundaries around what can be considered to be the result of a 
cultural influence and what is the outcome of an institutional influence. Institutions are 
crystallisations of culture, and culture is the substratum of institutional arrangements (Hofstede et 
al., 2002). In the case of transition countries, like China and Russia, it has also been argued that 
in the absence of well-functioning formal institutions, cultural influences take on greater 
importance (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000) and dominate over economic 
ideologies (Ralston et al., 1997). Subscribing to this view, we now discuss national cultural 
attributes of China and Russia and develop theoretical propositions of how these similarities and 
differences influence knowledge sharing, particularly through the lens of the in-group/out-group 
distinction. 
  
    
NATIONAL CULTURAL SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA 
AND RUSSIA 
Cultural theorists, such as Bond, Hofstede, Schwartz, Triandis, and others have focused largely 
on providing paradigmatic descriptions of national cultural values (although some also consider 
sub-national and organisational levels) and their manifestations (Franke et al., 2002). Their 
research has involved the development of national cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001), 
understanding of relationships between people (Trompenaars and Hampden-Tuner, 1997), and 
identification of shared patterns of subjective culture as cultural syndromes (Triandis, 2002). 
National culture influences a person’s actions, either by the in-built values toward which the 
actions are oriented, or in shaping a repertoire of strategies of action favouring or discouraging 
certain patterns of action (Triandis, 1989; Hofstede, 2001). Underlying assumptions and basic 
principles are culturally relative and this contributes to making organisational practices differ 
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(Ronen and Shenkar, 1985; Erez and Earley, 1987; Hofstede, 2001).  
 A significant body of literature has explored key characteristics of Chinese culture (Bian 
and Ang, 1997; Guthrie, 1998; Boisot and Child, 1999; Wright et al., 2002; Yang, 2002) and 
Russian culture (Yergin and Gustafson, 1994; Puffer and McCarthy, 1995; Naumov, 1996; Puffer 
et al., 1997; Elenkov, 1998; McCarthy and Puffer, 2003). Although the above mentioned studies 
provide valuable insights into national cultural features specific in the Chinese and Russian 
context, there is only a limited amount of research that examines explicitly the interface between 
national culture and knowledge sharing. Knowledge sharing in the China context has been 
examined by, among others, Peterson et al. (1990), Smith et al. (1996), Tsang (2002) and Wang 
et al. (2001). Based on studying business managers in the U.S. and China, Chow et al. (2000) 
found that if private knowledge has no potential to damage the sharer’s self-interests, there is no 
significant difference between U.S. and PRC nationals’ willingness to share. However, when 
examining knowledge that could potentially damage the sharer’s self-interests while benefiting 
the company, the Chinese respondents indicated a significantly higher propensity to share, 
thereby putting the interests of the collective ahead of their own. It was also found that the 
Chinese were significantly less inclined than were their U.S. counterparts to share information 
files with other employees not considered to be part of their in-group (Chow et al., 2000).   
 Recent research on management in Russia has indicated that Russians have a reticence to 
share knowledge and a tendency to work with those with whom they are familiar and to exclude 
those they consider outsiders (McCarthy and Puffer, 2003). This results in a situation in which 
people tend to guard knowledge which they view as being of harm or disadvantage. Elenkov 
(1998) argued that Russia’s fairly high power distance, along with high uncertainty avoidance 
and minimal trust, predisposes minimal disclosure of company information that is crucial to 
effective corporate governance and knowledge sharing. In examining knowledge sharing in 
Russia, Michailova and Husted (2003) found that the potential value of knowledge sharing is 
often defeated by what they termed “knowledge-sharing hostility”. They argued that knowledge 
hoarding is intensified in the context of many Russian organisations by two specific features. 
First, knowledge hoarding is a mechanism for coping with uncertainty and, second, knowledge 
hoarding is combined with a high respect for hierarchy and formal power. Similarly, the Not-
Invented-Here syndrome is intensified in the Russian organisational context by two additional 
features, namely strong group affiliation and suspicion of out-group members (Michailova and 
Husted, 2003).  
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  In order to advance research propositions that enable us to better understand knowledge 
sharing in the Chinese and Russian contexts, we have utilised the work of Hofstede (1980) and 
Triandis (1995, 1998). Hofstede’s (1980) original research and its extensions (Hoftsede, 1984, 
1991, 2001) provide a framework for studying national cultural differences on five dimensions: 
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and long term orientation. 
Despite being subject to some criticisms (McSweeney, 2002; Williamson, 2002), Hofstede’s 
(2001) model is acknowledged to be the most comprehensive (Kogut and Singh, 1988) and cited 
(Chandy and Williams, 1994) national cultural framework. A number of successive studies have 
documented a validation of the scores characterising national cultural differences over time and 
in various settings (Shane and Venkataraman, 1996; Mouritzen and Svara, 2002).  
 A central cultural dimension and probably the most well established cultural construct is 
individualism-collectivism (IC). IC is viewed to be the major distinguishing characteristic of how 
various societies process and deal with information (Early and Gibson, 1998; Hofstede, 1980, 
1991, 1994; Triandis, 1995, 1998; Bhagat et al., 2002) and therefore is particularly appropriate 
for developing our propositions on knowledge sharing. Parsons and Shils (1951) were the first to 
introduce IC to organisation theory using the terms self-orientation and collectivity-orientation. 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) used different terms, collaterality and individualism, as did 
Mead (1967) who referred to cooperation and individualism. In his 1980 study, Hofstede coined 
the terms individualism vs. collectivism. 
 
Individualism-Collectivism and Universalism-Particularism 
For the purposes of our analysis we follow the definition of IC as a cultural syndrome that 
represents a pattern of shared attitudes, values and beliefs around a particular theme (Triandis, 
1996). Individualism refers to the relationship between individuals and the collectivity which 
prevails in a given culture. Triandis et al. (1988) introduced the ideocentrism-allocentrism 
dimension, along with IC, and concluded that whereas members of individualistic cultures tend to 
subscribe to ideocentric assumptions and beliefs focusing on individual orientation and 
performance, those from collectivist cultures are likely to hold allocentric ideas emphasising 
harmony and cooperation. In an extensive review of the literature on IC, Triandis (1995) 
summarises four key attributes of this continuum: conceptions of the self; goal relationships; 
relative importance of attitudes and norms and emphasis on relationships.  
 In individualistic nations, independence is highly valued and personal achievement is put 
before group interest. The self is an autonomous entity relatively independent of groups. By 
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contrast, in collectivist cultures, qualities such as interdependence, loyalty, solidarity, and 
identification with the in-group are strongly emphasised (Hofstede, 2001). Also, whereas 
individualists emphasise task achievement, even when it requires sacrificing relationships, 
collectivists are more oriented towards establishing and maintaining harmonious relationships, 
sometimes at the expense of task achievement (Kim et al., 1994).  
 Although neither China nor Russia were included in Hofstede’s (1980) original IBM-
based study of national cultural dimensions, Hofstede (with Bond and the Chinese Cultural 
Connection group) subsequently analysed China and other authors have explored Russia’s 
positioning on Hofstede’s dimensions (see, for instance, Elenkov, 1998). In Table 2 we provide 
important dimensions, along with identifying similarities and differences between the two 
countries on the basis of which we formulate the propositions that follow.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 China’s high level of collectivism is documented in a number of earlier studies (Ho, 
1976; Oh, 1976; Li, 1978) as well as in Hofstede’s (2001) later study on national cultures. Family 
is a cornerstone of Chinese society with reciprocal obligations being limited not only to family 
and kinship but extended to non-kin ties in which people are expected to help each other as if 
they are fulfilling obligations to their family members (Bian and Ang, 1997). Moreover, in China, 
one’s word is one’s bond; to go against one’s given word is to lose face which destroys not only 
an individual’s reputation but also causes shame to their family and extended network (Sheer and 
Chen, 2003), which is very detrimental to an individual’s position within their group. Individuals 
tend to prioritise the group interests higher than their own and make decisions that are personally 
detrimental if they benefit the collective. Loyalty is paramount as the society fosters strong 
relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group. 
 Russian culture is also considered to be collectivist (Bollinger, 1994; Holt et al., 1994; 
Garrison and Artemyev, 1994; Puffer, 1994; Shama, 1994). Russia has a centuries-long tradition 
with collectivism and paternalism, as well as a history of more than seven decades with official 
Soviet ideology that stressed unity and equality (Piirainen, 1997). Individualistic qualities and 
behaviours have been traditionally qualified as undesirable and consequently, suppressed. Self-
accomplishment and personal achievements have been continuously associated with achieving 
the objectives of social collectivism (Holt et al., 1994). According to Vlachoutsicos and 
Lawrence (1990), Russian work groups have a keen sense of solidarity; they nourish a strong 
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sense of internal camaraderie and are cohesive and protective of collectivist norms. Ashwin’s 
(1996) research found that Russian organisational members identify three distinct forms of 
collectivity: the symbolic collectivity of the enterprise as a whole; the collective identification of 
the ordinary workers; and, the collectivity of the immediate work group. Most importantly, she 
also highlights that in each case the collective is defined negatively in relation to the outside.  
 Bhagat et al. (2002) have added the dimension of horizontalness-verticalness to the more 
generic IC dimension in order to gain a deeper understanding of how knowledge is transferred 
and processed by representatives of different national cultures. These authors have examined the 
moderating role of vertical individualism, horizontal individualism, vertical collectivism and 
horizontal individualism on cross-border transfer of organisational knowledge. They pointed out 
that whereas people in individualist societies see information as independent of its context, 
collectivist cultures emphasise the context in each piece of information. In terms of putting 
knowledge into action, collectivists are defined as being more sensitive to context-specific 
information while individualists are more likely to focus on knowledge when it concerns personal 
attributes. Moreover, according to Bhagat et al. (2002), collectivists are likely to emphasise the 
significance of tacit information and knowledge which is in contrast with individualists’ 
preferences for rational analyses based on codified written information. Finally, vertical cultures 
tend to process information and knowledge respecting hierarchical arrangements within 
organisations whereas horizontal cultures do not emphasise hierarchy in the process of organising 
knowledge and communication flows. 
 Both China and Russia are vertical collectivist cultures which suggests that people tend 
to think of themselves as different from other members of the in-group (Chen et al., 1997). 
Chinese and Russians focus on relationships created over long periods of time that are built on 
frequent exchanges rather than on sporadic and discrete in time exchanges favoured in more 
individualist societies. This is significant for knowledge sharing in that they will be much more 
likely to share knowledge when they have a long-term, in-group relationship established. 
Whereas in most individualistic cultures task relationships between managers and subordinates 
are separate from other dealings, in China and Russia interactions with others are viewed as part 
of a whole relationship. In China familial relationships are replicated in work situations with 
managers/bosses often being called “uncle” or “auntie” to demonstrate the level of respect they 
are accorded. Russian management culture, too, is characterised by a high degree of paternalism. 
Puffer (1996) traced the origins of this feature back to the 15th century and associated it with the 
need for strong paternalistic exchange relationships between the central power and the 
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subordinates when Russia was rebuilding after the Mongol invasion. When two individuals have 
a relationship or are in-group members, they know a great deal about the other individual’s 
private life; there simply is not the sharp divide between public and private noted in individualist 
cultures.  
 In his dimensions of cultural valuing, Trompenaars (1997) categorised societies as being 
particularist or universalist, and ranked both China and Russia as highly particularist. In 
particularist societies decisions are not based on uniform rules, rather consideration is given to 
making particularist judgements focused on the exceptional nature of present circumstances. In 
particularist societies the thinking is “this person is not ‘a citizen’ but my friend, brother, 
husband, child or person of unique importance to me, with special claims on my love or my 
hatred.  I must, therefore, sustain, protect or discount this person no matter what the rules say” 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997).  Members of particularistic societies such as Russia 
and China have a strong tendency to divide people into two categories: those they know and can 
trust and those who are strangers and who could be dangerous. In China’s particularistic culture, 
people focus on the exceptionality of present circumstances and make their decisions based on 
acquaintance or lack of acquaintance with others. Rules are not as important as personal relations; 
indeed, individuals are not managers or representatives of remote institutions, but are of unique 
personal importance with special claims on emotional involvement (Michailova and Worm, 
2003). According to Mikheyev (1987: 504), to Russians, lying, cheating, stealing, and, to an 
extent, even killing, by themselves have no positive or negative connotation: they have to be 
judged in terms of the particulars of the situation; they could be bad or good depending on the 
situation. 
 According to Bhagat et al. (2002: 213), while the broad context of collectivism 
facilitates knowledge transfer, the differences owing to horizontalness versus verticalness may 
impede such transfers. These authors concluded that particularistic norms, paternalistic practices, 
familism, and other nepotism-based practices that are found in some developing countries make it 
difficult to transfer knowledge to other cultural patterns. Given our unit of analysis and bringing 
into consideration the distinction between in-groups and out-groups in the Chinese and Russian 
transition societies, we propose:    
 
Proposition 1: Vertical collectivism and particularistic social relations in China and Russia lead 
to intensive social relations among organisational members, which facilitate knowledge sharing 
between in-group members in the workplace. 
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 And yet, there are important differences between China and Russia along the IC 
dimension. Both the origins and the essence of collectivism differ between the two countries. 
China’s collectivism originates from Confucianism (Bian and Ang, 1997) which has influenced 
the country since the 5th Century BC. Chinese culture is deeply ingrained in the Confucian and 
Taoist philosophy and ethics, according to which self-cultivation, human dignity and respect are 
significant factors that influence human relations. Confucianism advocates a simple, natural and 
harmonious way of living and individual integrity. According to Graham and Lam (2003), four 
thick threads of culture have bound the Chinese people for some 5000 years: agrarianism, 
morality, pictographic language, and wariness of foreigners. Due to the interdependent 
relationships in an in-group in China, individuals are concerned about, and motivated to, save 
face for in-group members (Sheer and Chen, 2003). The in-group is the source of identity, 
protection, and loyalty, and in exchange for such loyalty, knowledge can be expected to be shared 
within the in-group and withheld from those considered to be “outsiders” (Littrell, 2002). 
Therefore, we propose: 
 
Proposition 2: Chinese organisational members share knowledge with their in-groups presuming 
a group-interest motive in preserving the group’s well-being and face.  
 
 Russia’s collectivism has different origins. In Russia, strong collective instincts were 
born in the countryside in pre-revolutionary times. Long before the Soviet state, collective 
farming was encouraged by the Tsars because of their fear of anarchy. Ethics of the obshina, the 
commune of villagers, was embedded in the peasant psychology and often carried from the farm 
to the factory when peasants migrated to cities (Smith, 1990). People who belonged to the 
obshina lived together, worked at the fields together and were accustomed to a common fate. 
Russia’s strong sense of commonality developed in the pre-revolutionary times and was easily 
detected in the socialist collectivist-autocratic culture in which there was no place for the 
individual and her/his own way of thinking and behaving (Garrison and Artemeyev, 1994). 
Russia’s culture has been shaped under the strong influence of authoritarianism and orthodoxy. 
Although the group means a lot to Russians, there is an important difference as compared to 
China in that in Russia individuals strive to secure their dominant position in the group rather 
than being preoccupied with the group harmony. According to Mikheyev (1987), for Russians a 
struggle for domination within a group is the most natural thing in the world, and the essence of 
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human relations. The consideration of these particular features of Russian collectivism leads us to 
propose: 
 
Proposition 3: Russian organisational members share knowledge with their in-groups presuming 
a self-interest motive to establish personal domination.  
 
 Another important difference along the IC dimension between China and Russia is the 
degree of collectivism. Ralston et al. (1997) have argued that Chinese are significantly more 
collectivist than Russians. Hofstede (2001) has estimated the individualism score for China to be 
20. Chinese society has historically been preoccupied with collective action and de-emphasise 
and discourage personal goals and accomplishment (Oh, 1976; Li, 1978). It is not surprising that 
up until the 1990s in China, 85% to 90% of all businesses countrywide are collectively owned 
(Ralston et al., 1997). In the framework of Confucianism the individual is a social being whose 
identity is derived from her/his social network, e.g. the individual exists and is defined in relation 
to others. Therefore, Chinese always take into serious consideration what others think of them 
and expect from them. This has been perpetuated through, among others, the processes of family 
socialisation (Redding, 1990) as family constitutes the most important social unit in China. The 
five Confucian virtues (humaneness, justice, proper etiquette, wisdom and trustworthiness) are 
bound by the concept of harmony (Westwood, 1992), e.g. searching for the middle path instead of 
going to extremes and seeking compromise rather than entering conflicts. Chinese view their 
individual actions as an important contribution to their group’s harmony and well-being. We 
therefore propose: 
 
Proposition 4: China’s Confucian-based collectivism leads to knowledge sharing being 
motivated by the preference for maintaining harmonious relationships in the in-group.   
 
 Elenkov (1998: 139) has estimated the individualism score for Russia to be 45, a score 
considerably higher than China. Both Hofstede (1993) and Ralston et al. (1997) placed Russia at 
a midpoint of the IC scale. According to Elenkov (1997: 102), a competitive orientation of 
thinking is an important part of Russian mentality. Ardichvili et al. (1998) noted the preference of 
Russian business people for making decisions individually, rather than collectively.  Findings by 
Veiga et al. (1995) clearly indicated increasing individualism in Russia. Additionally, Giacobbe-
Miller et al. (2003) concluded that in Russia managers in joint ventures and private-owned 
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companies are becoming increasingly individualistic. Holt et al. (1994: 135) pointed out that 
Russian managers place a high value on both conformity and self-determination, a rather unusual 
combination of collectivist and individualist characteristics. They interpreted this finding 
suggesting that Russians publicly behave in accordance with majority expectations while 
privately maintaining different opinions. In a different framework, Vlachoutsicos and Lawrence 
(1990) have noted the simultaneous existence and use of centralising and decentralising forms of 
leadership and decision making. These authors emphasised that in practice, the centralisation of 
one-person leadership and the decentralisation of collectivism are not impossible to reconcile. 
The acceptance of collective supremacy over individual goals characteristic for Russians is mixed 
with elitism, tendency to domination and pyramidal group structures (Mikheyev, 1987). Russians 
do strive for individual success; at the same time, it is difficult for most of them to avoid feeling 
guilty while working towards achieving their personal goals and ambitions (Jones and Moskoff, 
1991; Puffer, 1994). On the basis of the above, we propose:    
 
Proposition 5: Russia’s increasing individualism reinforces Russians’ knowledge-sharing 
behaviour being motivated by maximising personal gains.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have examined the impact of national culture on knowledge-sharing in China 
and Russia, an issue not previously explored in detail in the literature. Our objective was to 
develop a set of theoretical arguments and propositions in relation to the impact of national 
culture on knowledge sharing in the context of these two major transition economies. We have 
undertaken a comparative analysis of the Chinese and Russian cultural attributes and have 
identified important similarities and differences between the two countries. We have analysed 
how these similarities and differences influence knowledge sharing in Chinese and Russian 
organisations. To this end, we introduced a group level of analysis as a link between the macro 
and the individual level. Our theoretical propositions were formulated from our research which 
found that the distinction between in-groups and out-groups has proved particularly important in 
the Chinese and Russian contexts. Moreover, within these parameters we also explored the 
interplay between individual knowledge-sharing behaviour and group membership.  
 Earlier research has documented that particularistic norms, paternalistic practices, 
familism, and other nepotistic practices hinder the transfer of  knowledge to other cultural 
patterns. However, as we have argued the distinction between in-groups and out-groups is of 
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decisive importance in the Chinese and Russian context. We conclude that in the case of China 
and Russia, vertical individualism and particularist social relations facilitate knowledge sharing 
within the boundaries of in-groups.   
 We have also demonstrated that there are important differences between China and Russia 
in terms of origins of, and degrees of, collectivism and that these differences impact on 
knowledge sharing in organisations. We proposed that Chinese organisational members share 
knowledge with their in-groups presuming a group-interest motive in preserving the group’s 
well-being and face whereas Russian organisational members share knowledge with their in-
groups presuming a self-interest motive to establish personal domination. Additionally, we 
argued that although both China and Russia are collectivist cultures, the level of collectivism in 
China is considerably higher than in Russia. We concluded that Russian national culture is 
becoming more individualistic and on this basis we proposed that increasing individualism 
reinforces Russians’ knowledge-sharing behaviour as being determined by maximisation of 
personal gains. We suggested that China differs in this regard and argued that China’s Confucian-
based collectivism leads to knowledge sharing being facilitated by preferences for maintaining 
harmonious relationships in in-groups. 
 
Directions for future research 
While we acknowledge that there are other influences that could be considered in a discussion of 
knowledge sharing in China and Russia (such as labour market developments, technological 
developments, federalisation, privatisation), we contend that it is cultural issues that have most 
application to a discussion of knowledge sharing.  
 In this paper we addressed gaps in previous research on knowledge sharing, yet our 
interpretations are still subject to certain limitations. We focused on the national cultural level 
when discussing cultural influences on knowledge sharing. This is not to suggest, however, that 
we negate the existence of sub-cultures within national culture or, like Hofstede (2001) that we 
are working from averaged responses from national groupings. Additionally, we have focused on 
IC as one dimension of cultural differences across countries. We have not analysed other cultural 
dimensions, such as power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity and long 
term-short term orientation (Hoftstede, 2001) although they may have direct impact on 
knowledge-sharing in groups and organisations. For instance, both China and Russia exhibit a 
high power distance index. Previous research has documented that high collectivism combined 
with high power distance results in a very strong propensity to resist change (Kirkman and 
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Shapiro, 1997) and, one may speculate, also a strong propensity to share knowledge. It would, 
therefore, be valuable to study couplings between various cultural dimensions in an effort to 
investigate their influences on knowledge sharing. 
 In extending Hofstede’s (1984) cross-cultural research, some theorists have suggested that 
within particular cultures there can be qualitatively different values (Wagner and Moch, 1986) 
and motives (Shamir, 1990). For the purposes of our analysis we have considered China and 
Russia as homogeneous settings. However, in reality each of these countries is very diverse. To 
our knowledge, no research has been conducted studying how qualitatively different values 
within the same culture are interrelated with knowledge sharing in groups and organisations. This 
is an area deserving attention and requiring both conceptual and empirical work. Such studies 
will potentially provoke credible alternative explanations of, for instance, the high failure rate of 
international strategic alliances in these countries.  
 It would be also highly desirable that future research generates empirical data, both 
qualitative and quantitative, that investigates the interplay between culture and knowledge 
sharing. Additionally, future research could examine other transition economies (such as the 
societies in Central and Eastern Europe). In so doing, researchers might  examine whether these 
countries’ geographical proximity to Western Europe, and their earlier shift to international 
political and economic institutions, has resulted in organisational cultures in which there is a 
greater propensity to share knowledge. 
  
Managerial implications 
Our study provides important insights particularly for international businesses that currently 
have, or seek to establish, subsidiary operations in China or Russia. While there are lessons to be 
drawn from this research that have equal application to China and Russia, international managers 
should also be careful not to assume that because both countries share a Communist heritage that 
they will demonstrate exactly the same approaches to knowledge sharing. Indeed, as we have 
demonstrated there are important institutional and cultural differences between the two countries 
that must be realised and accommodated when trying to establish and cultivate a knowledge-
sharing climate in Chinese and Russian organisations. 
 In the absence of a fully developed regulatory environment in both China and Russia, 
interpersonal connections became, and remain, integral to the conduct of business. Moreover, the 
repercussions of sharing information and knowledge that may potentially have been regarded as 
politically sensitive meant that both Chinese and Russians learnt to keep knowledge strictly 
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within trusted in-groups and to protect the members within from out-groups, and in some cases, 
strong hostility was expressed towards out-group members. Accordingly, international managers 
need to invest time and resources in establishing organisational cultures with high levels of trust 
so individuals and groups will feel “safe” in their discussions with others.  
  As vertical collectivism and particularism in China and Russia lead to more intensive 
sharing of knowledge amongst in-group members, international managers should be careful not to 
unilaterally introduce work teams without having considered the in-group/out-group 
configuration in the respective organisation. Rather, international managers should respect and 
work with the existing in-groups while in the process of building intra-organisational knowledge 
sharing. Departmental managers may also be utilised as intermediaries to build connections 
within organisations. Importantly, international managers should recognise that Chinese and 
Russians have different rationales for in-group knowledge sharing with the Chinese collectivist 
orientation manifest in preserving the group’s well-being and harmony while Russians’ 
increasing individualism demonstrates employees’ concern for personal domination and gains. As 
such, international managers may consider providing group-based incentives for knowledge 
sharing in China but individual status recognition in Russia. Finally, rather than being opposed to 
pre-existing relationships, international managers should make use of such in-group tendencies in 
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                    1.3 billion people                                         Largest territory in the world 
Multinational states with heterogeneous populations dominated by a single ethnic group 
                      Han Chinese                                                        Ethnic Russians 
Historically great powers 
Ruled by the Communist party for more than 50 years  
Nationalism: an important feature of national identity  
Currently important economically and militarily  
Key roles to play in establishing international stability  
In the process of becoming federal states 
Laws and procedures are not important; lack of general reciprocity in the society 
Cultivation of personal relationships and networks (in-groups) is highly important for 
substituting the lack of general reciprocity; nurturing dyadic reciprocity 
Differences 
Rising superpower Former power 
Among the highest GDP growth rates 
internationally 
Among the lowest GDP growth rates 
internationally 
Low country risk level Very high country risk level 
Quiet revolution Shock therapy 




 Table 2: China and Russia: Similarities and differences in cultural attributes 
 
                                                           CHINA                                               RUSSIA 






Vertical collectivist cultures 
Universalism vs. 
particularism 
Highly particularist cultures 
National culture (IC): Differences 
Origin of collectivism Confucian tradition and 
philosophy 
Pre-revolutionary developments; 
authoritarianism and orthodoxy 
Level of collectivism High  
Individualism score: 20 
(Hofstede, 2001) 
High, but lower than in China. 
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